

Managing the “Foreign” and “Domestic”: Kilsoo Haan, Korean Diasporic Nationalism and the U.S. Liberal State, 1931-1945

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Introduction

This article explores the dynamics of diasporic nationalism by examining the English language writings of a relatively obscure nationalist figure named Kilsoo Haan [Kilsu Han] during the 1930s. The dominant figure in most accounts of Korean émigré politics is without doubt Syngman Rhee, who later became the first President of the Republic of Korea in 1948. In 1919, Syngman Rhee was named President of the Korean Provisional Government, which was created in Shanghai, China to serve as a government in exile. Rhee based his activities in Washington D.C., where he directed lobbying campaigns to win diplomatic recognition and support for the Korean Provisional Government. Bitter factional disputes during the 1920s, however, incapacitated the ability of the Korean Provisional Government to act as a national sovereign state, greatly diminishing Rhee's authority to lead the independence movement. Consequently, Rhee would languish in relative isolation and political inertia for much of the 1930s.

In Rhee's absence from nationalist politics, new voices, new alliances, and new strategies, embodied in the activities of Kilsoo Haan, emerged to fill the void. In the early 1930s, Haan became involved in the Korean independence movement engaging in intelligence activities to combat the threat of what he called the “Japanization” of Hawaii. These activities reflected changes in the

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balance of power within the Korean nationalist movement in China and Manchuria. With Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and further military aggressions into the northern parts of China proper, the threat of war between China and Japan increased dramatically. Korean nationalists, in turn, gained substantial support from the Chinese Nationalist government to fight Japan as a common foe. In the process, left-wing nationalist groups, who had advocated direct military action against Japan instead of diplomatic recognition from the West, consolidated their forces and gained ascendancy over their more conservative counterparts who supported the Korean Provisional Government.¹ Haan's seemingly sudden emergence as a leading political voice within the nationalist movement in the United States came in the wake of these changes.

Kilsoo Haan's writings and lobbying campaigns during the 1930s revealed a strategic understanding of U.S. foreign affairs and international developments. In 1932, Kilsoo Haan helped create a new organization in Hawaii, the Sino-Korean Peoples League, which reflected the broader changes in the nationalist movement in China. The primary goals of the new organization included organizing intelligence and propaganda systems among Koreans throughout the diaspora and to enlist the support of the Chinese. Claiming to receive information regularly from a network of secret agents in China who had access to sensitive Japanese military plans, Haan used the Sino-Korean Peoples League to bolster his political expertise and prestige.

Lobbying actively through the League, Haan declared that Koreans in Manchuria, Siberia, China, and the United States could be indispensable in aiding the United States against Japanese militarism. Throughout the 1930s, Haan consistently appealed for material aid from the United States to support Korean military and espionage activities against the Japanese in Manchuria and China. In this manner, Haan's writings marked a departure from previous tactics taken by Korean nationalists in the United States who had emphasized a diplomatic approach in seeking recognition of the Korean Provisional Government from the U.S. State Department. Haan instead directed his lobbying efforts toward gaining the support of the U.S. military. In trying to garner the attention of military officials, Haan argued that the international situation in East Asia was inextricably linked to the domestic security of the United States. Haan ably exploited his self-proclaimed political expertise to

1. Chong-sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea - Part I: The Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Dae-Sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

establish his authority and prestige as a prominent figure in the Korean independence movement. In doing so, he drew considerable attention from U.S. government officials and the American public, at times drawing criticism as a self-serving propagandist.

Despite the important changes in the independence movement abroad and the emergence of new voices such as Kilsoo Haan, the historical record on Korean immigrant nationalist activities during the 1930s is conspicuously quiet. Most historical studies tend to skip over the decade of the 1930s altogether and pick up in the 1940s when U.S. entry into World War II created conditions favorable for Syngman Rhee to reassert his authority as diplomatic recognition of the Korean Provisional Government once again became paramount for the nationalist movement.² Throughout this period, Haan has been generally depicted as a secondary figure, known more for needlessly fomenting trivial and self-serving factional feuds with Rhee and other nationalist leaders.

This article seeks to re-read the significance of Kilsoo Haan, who I argue is key to understanding the trajectory of Korean diasporic nationalism. Although his ideas and claims at times seemed naive and implausible, Haan nevertheless put forth a clear, pragmatic vision, which marked an important shift in the discourse and strategies of the Korean nationalist movement. Following the breakdown of the Korean Provisional Government during the 1920s, Koreans had no legitimate authority of their own that could function as a sovereign state within the international system of nation-states. Under these circumstances, Haan's activities revealed an unconditional acceptance of U.S. sovereignty as fundamental to Koreans achieving their national goals. Haan sought to use the power of the United States to act as a sovereign state to pursue the national interests of Koreans throughout the diaspora. This strategic reliance on U.S. sovereignty would take on full expression in the 1940s, leading to what some have characterized as a neocolonial relationship with the United States in the years during and following World War II.³

2. Bong-Youn Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979); John K. Hyun, *A Condensed History of the Kungminhoe: The Korean National Association (1903-1945)* (Seoul: Korean Cultural Research Center, Korea University, 1986); Warren Won Yong Kim, *Koreans in America* (Seoul: Po Chin Chai, 1971); Brett H. Melendy, *Asians in America: Filipinos, Koreans, and East Indians* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977); and Timothy L. Savage, "The American Response to the Korean Independence Movement, 1910-1945," *Korean Studies* 20 (1996): 189-231.

3. For examples, see Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997); Nancy Abelman and John Lie, *Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and the Los Angeles Riots* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965-1982* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

This study situates Kilsoo Haan's political activities within the ongoing struggles to define and achieve coherent political action under the conditions of statelessness and exile. Japan's colonization of Korea between 1905 and 1945 left Koreans abroad without a state or nation. Simultaneously, many of them, who had been recruited to the United States as contract labor between 1903 and 1905, contended with daily struggles against racial discrimination and class exploitation. Korean immigrants were subjected to virulent anti-Asian sentiments in the United States manifested in various legal and extralegal forms that included exclusionary immigration laws, discriminatory economic sanctions, and physical violence.⁴ Koreans in the United States were also legally declared ineligible for citizenship and thus lacked any real legal recognition before the eyes of the U.S. state. Because of these circumstances, Korean immigrants in the United States were prevented from participating in the formal political processes in both the United States and Korea. Given that they lacked both sovereignty and citizenship rights, issues of state power and its uses were central to all Korean immigrant political concerns.

The circumstances of colonization and exile precipitated the migration of Koreans not only to the United States but also to Manchuria, Siberia, China, Europe, Mexico, and Cuba. By 1944, nearly 12 percent of all Koreans lived outside of the Korean peninsula.⁵ With this wide dispersal of Koreans, the Korean independence movement generated complex networks of communication and alliances as people, money, values, ideologies, and information continually traversed across national and regional boundaries, creating conditions for the emergence of what one scholar has aptly called "nationalism in a transnational community."⁶ Significant transnational sites in the Korean diaspora included Washington D.C, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Honolulu, Shanghai, Chungking, Paris, London, Manchuria, Siberia, and Mexico. These sites housed a host of ideologies and political organizations, dedicated to mobilizing support and disseminating information and resources for the Korean independence movement. These organizations and their attendant activities were at the heart of the emergent transnational networks that made up a community extending beyond regional and national boundaries.

4. Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans: An Interpretative History* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991) and Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989).

5. Glenn T. Trewartha and Wilbur Zelinsky, "Population Distribution and Change in Korea, 1925-1949," *Geographical Review* 45, no. 1 (1955): 14.

6. Robert G. Lee, "The Hidden World of Asian Immigrant Radicalism," in *The Immigrant Left in the United States*, ed. Paul Buhle and Dan Georgakas (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 256-288.

The concept of diaspora offers a useful theoretical framework for examining the multiple dimensions of Korean immigrant political participation. As a diasporic community in exile, the social and political identities of Koreans in America remained firmly rooted in their connections to their homeland. In particular, their daily experiences and activities focused on the struggle for the liberation of their homeland from Japanese colonial rule. Themes of displacement and the cause for the independence of their homeland were mobilized into various forms of collective action. Organizational activities of the nationalist movement emphasized aspects unique to Korean history and culture, as individuals and social groups were deeply invested in preserving and maintaining a national Korean identity outside of Korea.⁷ According to cultural theorist James Clifford, such diasporic experiences run counter to the national assimilationist ideologies and discourses in the United States.⁸ Clifford asserts, “the nation-state, as common territory and time, is traversed and, to varying degrees, subverted by diasporic attachments.”⁹ Accordingly, he claims that host societies such as the United States “cannot assimilate groups that maintain important allegiances and practical connections to a homeland or dispersed community located elsewhere.”¹⁰ As a result, diasporic groups often encounter strained relations with the host society, exhibited by a general lack of acceptance by the host country.¹¹ Indeed, the ability for Korean immigrants to become full

7. Although the question of exactly what constitutes a diaspora has been a topic of recent scholarly debate, the core elements entail a specific set of historical conditions involving the dispersal and displacement of particular groups of people from their ancestral homelands. Under these conditions, diasporic formations occur within the triadic interrelationships of the homeland, host countries, and dispersed settlements of co-diasporans. For more on the concept of diaspora, see Kim D. Butler, “Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse,” *Diaspora* 10, no. 2 (2001): 189-219; Lok C.D. Siu, *Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005); William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return,” *Diaspora* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 83-99; James Clifford, “Diasporas,” *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994): 302-336; Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (Seattle, WA, 1997); Adam McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842-1949,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no. 2 (1999): 306-37; and Donna R. Gabaccia, *Italy’s Many Diasporas* (Seattle, WA, 2000).

8. James Clifford, “Diasporas,” *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994): 302-336. Also see, Gabriel Sheffer, ed., *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1986) and Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989).

9. Clifford, 307.

10. Ibid.

11. William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return,” and Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An introduction*.

members and participants of the U.S. polity was severely constrained by their status as racialized aliens ineligible for citizenship. Constituted as not belonging to American society, Koreans in the United States held enduring social and political connections to their homeland. In sustaining such links to their homeland through their nationalist activities, Korean immigrants in the United States came to play vital roles in the process of Korean nation-building during and after the period of Japanese colonization.

At the same time, diasporic activities are fundamentally shaped by the relationship of diasporic groups with the host society in which they reside. Although Clifford maintains that cultural identities formed on the basis of real or symbolic connections to a homeland are central to diasporic formations, he also points out that the transnational networks emerging from the diaspora provide multiple sources for identity formation and political participation. As a result, he argues that diasporic groups cannot be entirely devoid of nationalist sentiment in their relation to their respective homelands because they “encode practices of accommodation with, as well as resistance to, host countries and their norms.”¹²

By the second decade of the twentieth century, the U.S. polity had emerged as a key arena for the diasporic political activities associated with the Korean nationalist movement. Korean immigrant participation in the nationalist movement especially focused on intensive lobbying efforts in the United States to persuade policymakers and private citizens to support Korean independence. Korean immigrant organizations ceaselessly pressed homeland related issues through both official and nonofficial channels of the American polity at national and local levels. Heavily influenced by American political values and ideals, these lobbying efforts consistently underscored the congruity of an independent and democratic Korea with U.S. ideological, economic, and political interests in East Asia. Koreans in the United States articulated distinct national identities as Koreans, but they also expressed a strong commitment to the principles and institutions of American democracy. Despite the barriers to their political participation, Korean émigrés in America gradually emerged as a distinct political presence in the United States. Although they were ostensibly disenfranchised, the process of diasporic political mobilization ultimately enabled Korean immigrants in the United States to emerge as viable political actors in the polities of both their homeland and the United States. Diaspora thus provides a useful analytical framework to understand the simultaneous involvement in both host and home country politics that came to constitute a single political sphere for many Koreans in America.

12. Clifford, 307.

In many ways then, Haan's rhetorical strategies and actions emanated from what one may call a Korean American perspective as he endeavored to advance the interests of Koreans in the United States and abroad simultaneously. Haan not only sought U.S. recognition of the national status of Koreans in relation to the liberation of Korea, but his organizing efforts also conspicuously positioned Koreans in the U.S. polity as ethnic Americans. Korean nationalism thus ironically facilitated the development of a collective identity as ethnic Americans. This identity was not solely rooted in cultural ties to the homeland or imagined notions of a Korean nation-state, but also emerged from the daily experiences of living in the United States.¹³ That is, ethnicity was not an intrinsic cultural identification carried over from Korea that was to be preserved or maintained. Rather, it was an ongoing process emerging from the daily interactions between immigrants and the dominant host society as immigrants adapted to specific historical realities at particular moments in time and place.¹⁴

Kilsoo Haan's political activities coincided with the development in the United States of what historian Gary Gerstle calls the "disciplinary state," which emerged during and after World War I.¹⁵ During this time, the federal government, augmented by actions at the state and local levels, began to sponsor a multitude of policies that increasingly expanded the power of the state over the daily lives of the American people. The government, for instance, initiated a series of coercive Americanization campaigns that "amounted to an extraordinary effort to reshape the nation in ways that would exclude the unwanted, reform those regarded as social and political degenerates, and punish those who continued to engage in un-American behavior."¹⁶ Gerstle also notes the rise of the disciplinary state brought about a rapid expansion in the state's surveillance of anti-American activities, particularly among foreign-born aliens and racial minorities. This surge in state surveillance was reflected in the dramatic growth of the Bureau of Investigation, the predecessor to the FBI, and the army's Military Intelligence Division, both of which facilitated the state's

13. George J. Sánchez, *Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 11.

14. Ibid.; April R. Schultz, *Ethnicity on Parade: Inventing the Norwegian American Through Celebration* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), 11-12; and Kathleen Neils Conzen, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli, "Forum: The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12 (Fall 1993): 5.

15. Gary Gerstle, *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 91-94.

16. Ibid., 91.

ability to exert its power and influence over the daily lives of its constituency.¹⁷

This study shows that these types of activities associated with the disciplinary state were salient in the daily experiences of Koreans in the United States. Haan did not exclusively center his lobbying campaigns on influencing U.S. foreign policies regarding events and developments abroad. Rather, Kilsoo Haan's organizing strategies and efforts were every bit as much directed toward shaping the domestic policies of the disciplinary state. Much of Haan's activities during the 1930s portrayed Japanese aliens and citizens in the United States as dangerously anti-American. Haan informed U.S. government officials that a primary objective of the Sino-Korean Peoples League was "to expose un-American Japanese activities in helping America, in the hope that by serving America an eventual change in the Pacific area may help us."¹⁸ Haan gained considerable attention in Hawaii publicizing the alleged deleterious effects of "Japanization." Through what he called "constructive Americanism," Haan believed Koreans in the United States and Hawaii could serve as valuable allies of the United States in combating the supposed Japanese threat at home and abroad. Haan also sought to use this "constructive Americanism" to claim the right of Korean participation in the U.S. public sphere

Ironically, this sense of a Korean ethnic identity would be articulated most saliently during World War II when the disciplinary state came to challenge Korean loyalty and allegiance to the United States. In the advent of World War II, the U.S. state came to scrutinize not only the Japanese, but also Kilsoo Haan and Korean nationalist activities in general. In December 1941, the United States entered World War II after declaring war on Japan following the attack on Pearl Harbor. For Koreans in the United States, America's entry into World War II signaled an auspicious moment in their struggle for national independence. Koreans residing throughout the United States eagerly anticipated the opportunity at last to ally themselves unequivocally with America in a common war effort against Japan. However, Koreans on the U.S. mainland and Hawaii were stunned to learn that the U.S. government had classified them as subjects of the Japanese empire and were accordingly subject to enemy alien restrictions. As the disciplinary state imposed its coercive policies upon Koreans and Japanese alike, Kilsoo Haan and other Koreans in the United States found themselves trying to counter the logic of the disciplinary state, whose policies

17. Ibid., 92. Also see Joan M. Jensen, *Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

18. U.S. National Archives, RG 59 895.01/93; RG 165 Regional File 2266 Folder 4 Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41).

they had earlier sought to propagate. In the process, Korean immigrants continually constructed a Korean ethnic identity in relation to the American state and society.

New Voices, New Strategies: Kilsoo Haan and the Politics of Korean Nationalism

In many ways, Kilsoo Haan seemed to be an unlikely successor to Syngman Rhee. Born in Korea on May 31, 1900, Haan arrived in Hawaii on May 29, 1905, with his parents who had come as laborers. His father ended up returning to Korea in 1910. Kilsoo stayed in Hawaii, attending the Korean Compound School and the Kaiulani School, but did not advance beyond the 8th grade. In August 1920, he departed for San Francisco to attend the Salvation Army Training School in preparation for the ministry. After completing his training in San Francisco, Haan returned to Honolulu on July 15, 1921. He was then sent to the island of Kauai to serve as a Salvation Army representative. He served the Salvation Army for six years earning the rank of Captain. In 1926, Haan married Stella Yoon, a fellow Korean from Honolulu. That same year, he resigned from the Salvation Army, reportedly because his wife's religious beliefs conflicted with the Salvation Army, and the couple settled in Honolulu.¹⁹

In the early 1930s, Haan became involved in the Korean independence movement first as a member of the Korean National Association of Hawaii. In October 1931, Haan, with his colleague Chung Doo-ok, formed the Korean Information Bureau, as part of the Korean National Association (KNA). The purpose of the Korean Information Bureau was to obtain and collect information about political developments in East Asia following Japan's invasion of Manchuria and to report this information to the U.S. government on a regular basis. The work of the Bureau continued until the spring of 1932 when KNA officers Henry Kim and Warren Kim, both of whom opposed the existence of the group within the KNA, forced the dissolution of the Bureau. Around this same time, the prominent nationalist figure Kim Kiusic came to Hawaii from China. With the aid of Haan, Kim Kiusic, who was organizing

19. U.S. National Archives, RG 165 Regional File, Box 2267, Folder 1: Korea – Government Reports Concerning Haan, “Federal Bureau of Investigation Memorandum on Kilsoo Haan,” August 28, 1942, p. 1; RG 165, Box 2265, Folder 13: Korea – Nationalist Groups, “Korean Independence Movement in the United States and Hawaii,” December 2, 1942, p. 7; RG 165, Box 2260 – Korea, File 3020: Kilsoo K. Haan, “Memorandum on Kilsoo K. Haan Propaganda Activities,” December 20, 1943, p. 9.

nationalist activities in China and Manchuria, established the Sino-Korean Peoples League of Hawaii to combat actively “Japanism” and to establish intelligence networks in Korea, Japan, and China in aiding the Chinese against the Japanese. Kim returned to China one year later while Haan continued his “intelligence” activities through the Sino-Korean Peoples League.²⁰ Haan’s activities soon drew the attention of government and military officials in Hawaii.

In early 1933, Kilsoo Haan submitted a document entitled “A Survey of Public Opinion among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii” to U.S. military officials in Hawaii. Written by Haan under his pen name, W.K. Lyhan, the Survey declared that an inevitable war between Japan and the United States was quickly approaching. The forcible occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese military in September 1931 provided the most recent evidence of Japan’s aggressive plan to control the entire Pacific area. Stating that the United States was “the only remaining obstacle in their plan for consolidation of Continental [sic] Asia to the Japanese Empire,” Haan cautioned that Japan was preparing for “an attack without warning” on the Hawaiian Islands.²¹ Given the American government’s preoccupation with the domestic situation involving the Great Depression and the general mood of isolationism among the American public, Haan believed that the time was opportune for a Japanese surprise attack on the United States.²²

Alluding to evidence gathered in his survey, Haan sought to convince U.S. officials that Japan had already established advanced preparations for a massive attack targeting the Hawaiian Islands. Pointing out that the Japanese comprised nearly half of the total population in Hawaii, Haan asserted that Hawaii represented “a unique and peculiar situation which has no parallel.”²³ Haan claimed to have uncovered an array of espionage activities within the Japanese community in Hawaii. In particular, Haan identified three main groups among

20. U.S. National Archives, Records of the Office of the Chief Naval Operation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Sabotage Espionage, Counterespionage Section (SEC), Oriental Desk, 1936-46, RG 38, Box 15, Folder – Analysis of the Korean Situation, “Topical Study - Analysis of the Korean Situation,” August 13, 1943, p. 16; RG 165, Box 2265, Folder 13: Korea – Nationalist Groups, “Korean Independence Movement in the United States and Hawaii,” December 2, 1942, p. 2; RG 165, Box 2260 – Korea, File 3020: Kilsoo K. Haan, “Memorandum on Kilsoo K. Haan Propaganda Activities,” December 20, 1943, p. 9.

21. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, Military Intelligence Division (MID) 1766-S-146-2, “A Survey of Public Opinion among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii,” p. 3.

22. *Ibid.*, 5.

23. *Ibid.*, 1.

the Japanese in Hawaii engaged in espionage activities, which he thought to be detrimental to the national security of the United States. Haan vividly described a scenario, in which these three groups, working in conjunction with the Japanese military, could launch a surprise attack on Hawaii at any given moment:

On any one peaceful night many prominent American businessmen, plantation managers, army and navy officers will awake to discover with horror and suprise [*sic*] that their trusted cook, maid, yardman or chauffer has poisoned or mortally wounded some of the members of their family . . . Simultaneously with the first attack on the homes of responsible citizens, every locality will be attacked by thousands of Japanese citizens with the aid of marines and sailors.²⁵

Haan asserted that the United States needed to take immediate military action against Japan abroad to prevent such an attack on American soil. Referring to the Stimson Doctrine, Haan asserted “Uncle Sam is now an active participant in the Far Eastern politics” and should therefore take more decisive action against Japan in East Asia.²⁶ In 1931, U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson issued a statement, known as the Stimson Doctrine, condemning the Japanese military takeover of Manchuria as a violation of the Open-Door policy, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Nine-Power Treaty. According to the doctrine, the United States would refuse to recognize any territorial changes that had come about through conquest. For Haan, the condemnation of Japan in the Stimson Doctrine suggested that the United States had publicly declared Japan as a dangerous threat to international peace, “bringing about the possibility of war with Japan.”²⁷ Haan declared that the United States must follow the policy implications set forth in the Stimson Doctrine by enforcing the international treaties violated by Japan’s occupation of Manchuria and forcibly ousting Japan from Manchuria. By taking an offensive posture against Japanese aggressions abroad, Haan believed that the American military could safely protect the national security of the United States at home by preventing Japan from forcing America into a defensive war.

Haan’s Survey represented a new strategic approach among Korean

24. *Ibid.*, 4-6.

25. *Ibid.*, 6.

26. *Ibid.*, 8.

27. *Ibid.*

nationalists in the United States. Departing from previous tactics that emphasized a diplomatic approach, Haan did not seek official recognition of the Korean Provisional Government from State Department officials. Instead, Haan directed his lobbying efforts toward gaining the support of the U.S. military. Depicting Japan as a militaristic nation “dominated by imperialistic aims knowing no bounds,” Haan sought to link the domestic threat of a Japanese attack on U.S. soil with Japan’s recent aggressions in Manchuria.²⁸ As such, Haan argued that the international situation involving Japanese aggressions abroad was inextricably linked to the domestic security of the United States. In further seeking to gain the attention of military officials, Haan also drew attention to alleged anti-American activities conducted by Japanese within the United States, thereby localizing the Japanese threat. In denouncing all Japanese aliens and citizens as potential threats to the security of the American nation, Haan implicitly positioned himself and Koreans in the United States antithetically to the Japanese in that Koreans were loyal to the American government and would openly stand by the United States in the event of war with Japan.

Kilsoo Haan expanded upon the ideas set forth in his “A Survey of Public Opinion among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii” in a more lengthy document submitted to U.S. Secretary of War, George Dern, in Washington D.C. The document, entitled “Korea’s Appeal,” once again emphasized “the grave situation of the Far East” posed by Japanese aggressions in Manchuria and the rapid approach of an inevitable conflict between the United States and Japan.²⁹ Haan repeatedly asserted that the United States had the power and influence to cease further Japanese aggressions and thereby prevent a costly war.

Seeking to convince American government officials to take military action against Japan, Haan highlighted the significance of the United States as a vital force in East Asian political affairs. Like previous appeals from Korean nationalists before him, Haan brought attention to the 1882 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Korea with particular reference to the clause concerning the obligation of either nation to exert its “good offices” to aid the other in cases of national crises caused by the belligerent actions of a third power.³⁰ However, unlike those before him, Haan provided a more complex and nuanced analysis of relations between Korea and the United

28. *Ibid.*, 6.

29. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 2657-H-392-2, “Korea’s Appeal,” April 20, 1933, p. 1.

30. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 2657-H-392-2, “Korea’s Appeal: American-Korean Treaty-1882” April 20, 1933, pp. 1-13.

States, demonstrating a strong knowledge of diplomatic relations between the two nations.

Haan acknowledged the naivety of his predecessors in equating good offices with intervention. Rather than solely basing his appeal for U.S. intervention on the reciprocity clause of “good offices,” Haan tried to underscore the larger historical significance of the treaty. Boldly asserting, “few treaties have had greater influence on the course of events in the Far East,” Haan observed that the 1882 treaty had equipped the United States with the legal authority to exert its influence in shaping the overall balance of power in East Asia.³¹ He explained at length:

In a sense, the U.S. as a result of the treaty of 1882 assumed a certain moral and legal obligation connected with the question of Korea's status as an independent power, and to the extent that the treaty upset the balance of power between China and Japan and later Japan and Russia. The U.S. was responsible in no small measure for the subsequent course of events, ultimately so disastrous to the course of peace in the Far East. If the United States had adopted a strong policy toward maintaining Korea's independence it could have eliminated the Sino-Japanese war of 1904-05, thus possessing the key to permanent peace in the Far East and the guarantee of the Open Door of Asia. It is safe to say if the U.S. had intervened in the early stages of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan could never have expanded her power, as she has done to-day and the Manchurian question would have been a myth.³²

Stressing that Korea had always been the cornerstone to peace and stability in East Asia, Haan argued that the U.S. government's failure to fulfill its treaty obligations to Korea represented a larger failure on the part of the United States to realize its role as a vital player in the political affairs of East Asia. As a result, a large-scale military conflict now directly endangered not only U.S. interests in East Asia, but perhaps more significantly the loss of American lives and property on U.S. soil. Nevertheless, Haan maintained that the United States still had the power to prevent a direct attack through immediate military action against Japanese expansionism in Manchuria.

Haan assured military officials that the United States was not alone in its fight against Japan. Due to Japan's forced occupation of Manchuria, Haan declared that Koreans and Chinese were now part of the same struggle to

31. *Ibid.*, 1.

32. *Ibid.*, 12.

liberate their respective lands from Japanese imperialists. As evidence of the new alliances created by Japanese aggressions abroad, he attached a formal declaration of support between Korean and Chinese nationalist groups in Hawaii to “unite the revolutionary forces of China and Korea in checking Japan’s Imperialism out of the Asiatic continent.”³³ According to Haan, Japanese aggressions in East Asia had now drawn the United States into the same conflict with Japan. Haan wrote, “[Japan] will not only attempt to conquer China but she will make a desperate attempt to control the mastery of the Pacific Ocean. Therefore America faces the same enemy as Korea and China are facing.”³⁴ Accordingly, Haan believed Koreans and Chinese represented important allies of the United States against Japanese aggression. Seeking to mobilize a tripartite alliance against Japan, Haan emphasized that Koreans could play an indispensable role in the fight against Japan. “Koreans are ready to cooperate with China and America . . . We have the spirit and we have men ready to lay down their lives for this worthy cause. But we lack arms, ammunition and money to carry out our aggressive program in [sic] a major scale.”³⁵

Haan proposed a program of action against Japan that outlined Korean involvement in a variety of capacities, which included armed resistance, military training, espionage, and propaganda work. In conjunction with the Chinese army, Haan believed his program involving Koreans in China, Manchuria, Korea, and Japan could successfully oust Japan’s military forces from occupied territories in Korea and Manchuria, and ultimately “overthrow the present militaristic Japanese Government.”³⁶ To implement his plan, Haan requested from the Department of War a sum of one million dollars annually with the addition of arms and ammunition for a three-year period. Haan assured the U.S. government that this material aid would ensure that the war with Japan would remain “localized in China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan” and ultimately prevent “a major war with America thus saving the lives and blood of

33. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 2657-H-392-2, “Petitions to the Republic Government of China by the Koreans in Hawaii,” April 11, 1931, p. 2. Haan also included a letter sent to him from the Kuomintang of Hawaii. The letter, dated January 11, 1932, announced that the Kuomintang of Hawaii at their most recent delegate convention had unanimously passed a resolution pledging their support for Korean independence. They continued that they would formally submit the resolution to the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Nationalist government in China.

34. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 2657-H-392-2, “Korea’s Appeal” April 20, 1933, p. 8.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*, 9.

Americans.”³⁷ Rather than requesting diplomatic recognition of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG), Haan believed Koreans first needed to demonstrate their usefulness to the United States. As such, he proposed that the United States pledge its assistance by recognizing the KPG after the three-year “trial” period.³⁸

Haan’s plan entailed close coordination between U.S. military officials and Korean nationalists throughout the diaspora. Calling for the need for a new Korean organization that reflected his direct action tactics, Haan proposed the creation of A-K-R-O-N (Another Korean Revolutionary Organization is Necessary), which ostensibly referred to the Sino-Korean Peoples League. He likened the new organization to the U.S.S. Akron, a dirigible designed by the U.S. Navy, which had been destroyed in a fiery crash off the coast of New Jersey in stormy weather on April 4, 1933. Rather than replacing the U.S.S. Akron with a new dirigible, Haan advised that “the American government should build another ‘Akron,’ this time not a floating palace, but a slow moving and death giving war-tank . . . The Koreans are waiting for a call to arms and if America wishes to organize these scattered Koreans for action, America only needs to pass the word—A-K-R-O-N.”³⁹ Koreans strategically located throughout the diaspora could be mobilized through A-K-R-O-N to defeat the Japanese and end the threat of war between the United States and Japan. Rather than spending money on a new dirigible, Haan urged the U.S. military to provide material and financial aid for his proposed plan for military action, which could be successfully implemented through A-K-R-O-N.⁴⁰

In his call for A-K-R-O-N, Haan alluded to the inadequacies of existing nationalist organizations. The KNA, for instance, was in a state of organizational malaise and inertia due to debilitating factional feuds during the early 1930s. Moreover, Haan had little faith in the Korean Provisional Government, which was also in a state of inactivity and disarray. Given the lack of a legitimate state authority within the Korean diaspora, Haan astutely understood diplomatic recognition from the United States would have little value. Rather, he proposed that a new organization, presumably the Sino-Korean Peoples’ League working under the aegis of A-K-R-O-N, should be responsible for directing military operations against the Japanese abroad. In

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*, 10.

39. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 2657-H-392-2, “Korea’s Appeal: A-K-R-O-N” April 20, 1933, pp. 1,3.

40. *Ibid.*, 3-5.

doing so, Haan sought to position himself and the Sino-Korean Peoples' League at the forefront of the Korean nationalist movement in the United States and abroad.

These priorities, as outlined by Haan in his "Survey of Public Opinion among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii" and "Korea's Appeal," reflected changes in the nationalist movement abroad, particularly in China. The independence movement entered the 1930s in a dormant state due to repeated disappointments on the international front and debilitating factional strife. However, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 stirred the movement out of its inertia as Korean nationalists found a powerful new ally against the Japanese. Provoked by Japan's increasing aggressions into Chinese territories, first into Manchuria and then into the northern parts of China proper, the Chinese government began to reach out to Korean nationalists in China to fight the Japanese as a common foe. Under these circumstances, Korean nationalist groups in China and Manchuria renewed and reorganized their activities after 1931 with a new vigor.

Soon after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Korean Provisional Government, under the leadership of Kim Ku, attracted the attention of Chiang Kai-shek, who headed the Chinese Nationalist government. Chiang provided Kim Ku with monthly financial support to mobilize and train Korean officers, who would work closely with the Chinese military. Kim, however, squandered the promising opportunities offered by the Chinese by failing to consolidate his leadership over the various groups affiliated with the KPG. As a result, the KPG continued to remain deeply divided and largely ineffective throughout most of the 1930s.⁴¹

The inability of the KPG to capitalize on its alliance with the Chinese Nationalist government provided an opportunity for leftist groups to gain greater prominence. By the end of the 1920s, the left consisted of several different organizations such as Comintern-oriented Communists in Siberia, nationalist-communists in Shanghai and Manchuria, and moderate leftist nationalists with no specific organizational affiliation such as former KPG minister, Kim Kiusic. Like their counterparts on the right, the left was largely divided into feuding factions at the beginning of the 1930s. However, Japan's military incursions into Manchuria and China in 1931 helped launch concerted efforts to create a united-front within the left.

Out of the various groups within the left, Kim Won-bong, a nationalist-communist, emerged as the most prominent leader in the early 1930s.⁴² Kim's

41. Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 185-88.

42. Kim Won-bong was also known as Kim Yaksan, which he used as his pen name.

involvement in the nationalist movement dated back to 1919. In the aftermath of the March First movement, Kim organized a small militia group in Manchuria. The group, called Uiyoldan (The Righteous Fighters Corps), engaged in terrorist guerilla tactics against the Japanese and gained quite a bit of notoriety for its terrorist actions. In the late 1920s, Kim became affiliated with the Korean Communist Party in Shanghai and helped organize Korean communist groups in China.⁴³

Japan's increasing aggressions into Chinese territory forced Kim Won-bong to retreat to Nanking, where he made contact with high-ranking officials of the Chinese Nationalist government. In May 1932, he proposed a Sino-Korean alliance to fight the Japanese. Apparently impressed with Kim's ideas, Chiang Kai-shek decided to assist Kim with a monthly stipend to support his military activities. Additionally, Chiang provided Kim with the use of Chinese military facilities to train Koreans for military and terrorist activities against the Japanese in Manchuria.⁴⁴

Kim Won-bong's arrival in Nanking coincided with attempts by Kim Kiusic to create a new united front in the summer of 1932. Kim Kiusic sought to unify all Korean nationalist groups into a single organization. To these ends, he formed the Korean Anti-Japanese Front Unification League on November 10, 1932. Initially, the League functioned primarily as an intermediary organization in attempting to bring about a unified front.⁴⁵ Under these auspices, Kim Kiusic arrived in the Hawaii between 1932 and 1933, where he helped to establish the Sino-Korean Peoples League with Kilsoo Haan.⁴⁶

Kim Kiusic continued to recruit nationalist groups into a united front against the Japanese for the next three years. However, he encountered great resistance from the KPG and its supporters, many of whom were unwilling to join Kim Kiusic's united front because doing so would require the dissolution of the KPG. Despite Kim Kiusic's extensive efforts to try to convince Kim Ku and his KPG supporters to participate in the united front, Kim Ku repeatedly refused. In the

43. Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 189-90.

44. Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea - Part I: The Movement*, 174; Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 190-91.

45. Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 191-92. Korea – Nationalist Groups, "Korean Independence Movement in the United States and Hawaii," December 2, 1942, p. 2; RG 165, Box 2260 – Korea, File 3020: Kilsoo K. Haan, "Memorandum on Kilsoo K. Haan Propaganda Activities," December 20, 1943, p. 9.

46. Korea – Nationalist Groups, "Korean Independence Movement in the United States and Hawaii," December 2, 1942, p. 2; RG 165, Box 2260 – Korea, File 3020: Kilsoo K. Haan, "Memorandum on Kilsoo K. Haan Propaganda Activities," December 20, 1943, p. 9.

summer of 1935, Kim Kiusic and other leftist organizations from China, Manchuria, and Hawaii convened a plenary conference in the Chinese city of Nanking. At the conference, all participating groups dissolved their organizations and formed a single alliance called the Korean National Revolutionary party (KNRP). The alliance consisted of members of Kim Won-bong's Uiyoldan, two major military groups in Manchuria, members of groups formerly associated with the KPG, and the Sino-Korean Peoples League of Hawaii. Owing to the organizational and numerical strength of his Uiyoldan group, Kim Won-bong and his close associates assumed leadership of the new organization.⁴⁷ Although the participation of Kim Ku and the KPG was conspicuously absent, historian Chong-Sik Lee described the formation of the Korean National Revolutionary party as an "undeniable success" in unifying a disparate group of organizations, and represented the strongest Korean nationalist group.⁴⁸ Kim Ku and the KPG were now a distant second, offering little challenge to the Korean National Revolutionary party. Haan's seemingly sudden emergence as a prominent political voice within the nationalist movement in the United States came in the wake of these important changes in the Korean liberation movement abroad.

Korean American Ethnic Nationalism and "Constructive Americanism"

Haan failed to elicit a response from the U.S. War Department with his "Korea's Appeal." However, his "Survey of Public Opinion among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii" generated considerable attention from American military officials and other government authorities at both the local and federal levels. Upon receipt of Haan's survey, the military intelligence division in Hawaii forwarded the document to B.H. Wells, the Commanding General of Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, and S.B.D. Wood, the U.S. Attorney for the Territory of Hawaii.⁴⁹ From the beginning, government and military officials, such as Wells and Woods, approached the survey with some skepticism, doubting the veracity of some of Haan's more exaggerated statements. However, the survey did cause serious

47. Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 193-95.

48. *Ibid.*, 195.

49. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146-2, "Necessity for Agent of Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii," March 14, 1933.

concern about the existence of espionage groups within the Japanese community in Hawaii. In early March 1933, both Woods and Wells requested the Department of Justice in Washington D.C. to conduct a formal investigation into Haan's allegations of organized espionage activity among Japanese residents of Hawaii. According to Wells, the Army was ill suited to conduct a "proper investigation and complete evaluation" of Haan's report due to "considerations of law and policy."⁵⁰ Haan's Survey further prompted Major Wells to request from the Bureau of Investigation to appoint a special agent in Hawaii:

Because of its location at the junction of world passenger routes, because of its strategic military value, and because of the many alien races strongly represented here and the cosmopolitan character of its society, Honolulu is and has long been a focus of intrigue There is a real need here at all times for a loyal, intelligent experienced operative of the Bureau of Investigation, who will work through the local United States attorney in co-operation with the Army authorities.⁵¹

The Department of Justice promptly complied by appointing a special agent from the Bureau of Investigation, James P. MacFarland, to investigate the facts and statements contained in Haan's survey.

Personally interviewing Kilsoo Haan, MacFarland meticulously went through the entire survey paragraph by paragraph with Haan. MacFarland pressed Haan to provide further details and his sources for each paragraph of text.⁵² Haan claimed that most of his information was gathered by himself and some 60 Korean agents working for him. Explaining that "the inevitability of war between the United States and Japan are matters freely discussed among the Japanese," Haan told MacFarland that he had compiled the survey based on his conversations with Japanese residents in Hawaii.⁵² When MacFarland continued to press Haan to provide actual names of individuals and concrete documentary evidence, Haan replied with vague and evasive answers.

Through the course of his month long investigation, which began in early April, MacFarland came to believe that the ideas contained in the survey were not the work of Haan. "An oriental without an educational background could

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146-5, J.P. MacFarland, "Report of Investigation in Hawaii - Survey of Public Opinion Among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii," May 6, 1933, pp. 3-15.

not write with the fluency and power of language as is evidenced by the grammar and expression in the said Survey,” MacFarland wrote in his report. Instead, MacFarland was convinced that “some one thoroughly versed in the English language edited the said Survey.”⁵⁴ In particular, MacFarland believed that Haan had taken his ideas from a book entitled *The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33*, originally published in London in 1925 and reprinted in the United States by the Houghton and Mifflin Company in 1932.⁵⁵ The book, written by a British naval expert Hector C. Bywater, was a hypothetical account of a war between the United States and Japan. Bywater explained the premise of his book in his preface: “Although this book portrays the course of an imaginary war between the United States and Japan, it has not been written to support the view that such a conflict is either close at hand or inevitable.”⁵⁶ However, he cautioned that a naval war between the two nations “cannot be dismissed as wholly impossible.”⁵⁷ Bywater sought to counter prevalent expert opinions that discounted completely the possibility of a naval war between Japan and the United States on the grounds of its strategic impossibility. Providing a range of possible strategic moves and counter moves, Bywater argued that such a war was not beyond the realm of possibility, even if it was improbable.⁵⁸

During this interview with Haan, MacFarland brought forth a copy of *The Great Pacific War* and pointedly asked Haan if the ideas contained in his survey were based on the contents of Bywater’s book. Haan acknowledged familiarity with the book and admitted to MacFarland that he had been influenced by it while writing the survey. However, Haan remained adamant that he and his agents had personally gathered the data for the survey based on the “considerable war talk in Japanese circles.”⁵⁹

53. Ibid., 19.

54. Ibid., 2.

55. Hector C. Bywater, *The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33* (London: Constable & Co. LTD., 1925). U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146-5, J.P. MacFarland, “Report of Investigation in Hawaii - Survey of Public Opinion Among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii,” May 6, 1933, p. 2.

56. Bywater, v.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., v-vii.

59. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146-5, J.P. MacFarland, “Report of Investigation in Hawaii - Survey of Public Opinion Among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii,” May 6, 1933, p. 19.

MacFarland remained unconvinced and turned instead to investigating Haan's personal background to determine his motives for writing the survey.⁶⁰ MacFarland interviewed a number of acquaintances of Haan in Hawaii, including officials of the Korean National Association. According to MacFarland, all those interviewed characterized Haan as "unreliable" and "untrustworthy."⁶¹ KNA officials, Henry Kim and Warren Kim, were particularly critical of Haan. They confirmed that Haan had been a former officer in the KNA, but was no longer affiliated with the Association. Since leaving the KNA, they claimed that Haan and his colleagues had attempted to put themselves in positions of influence and leadership within the overall body of Korean organizations in Hawaii. KNA officials stated that Haan and his men sought to "display their power and authority" by constantly quoting statements allegedly made to them by U.S. Army Intelligence officers, who, according to Haan, granted him the power to unify all Korean organizations in Hawaii under his direct authority.⁶² In the process, MacFarland's interviewees claimed that Haan went about "creating and circulating falsehood about the officers of the Korean National Association"⁶³

Despite this information, MacFarland decided to pursue further information on any possible involvement of the KNA. MacFarland sought out and interviewed Korean National Association of Hawaii President Lee Chung Kum, whose signature had been attached to Haan's survey. When questioned about his role in the writing of the survey by MacFarland, Lee adamantly denied any involvement with Haan. Lee informed MacFarland that Haan had approached him for his signature, claiming that "[Haan] would hold himself responsible for the information embodied in the report and the report would bring the Korean National Association and the Korean nationals into closer connection with the United States Government Agencies here."⁶⁴ According to Lee, Haan also assured him that the survey "was only a matter of opinion" and so he agreed to sign the survey "without careful examination or due deliberation which my little knowledge of English language renders difficult."⁶⁵ Lee further denied holding

60. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146/2-3, April 12, 1933; April 24, 1933; May 6, 1933.

61. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146-5, J.P. MacFarland, "Report of Investigation in Hawaii - Survey of Public Opinion Among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii," May 6, 1933, p. 22.

62. *Ibid.*, 25.

63. *Ibid.*, 25.

64. *Ibid.*, 23.

65. *Ibid.*, 23-24.

any information concerning the existence of Japanese espionage groups in Hawaii and did not know anyone who held such knowledge.

Upon the completion of his month long investigation on May 6, 1933, MacFarland concluded in his final report that the facts and statements in Haan's survey were false and inaccurate. According to MacFarland, Haan had simply lifted ideas and text from the hypothetical account in *The Great Pacific War* and passed them off as his own. In his lengthy written report, MacFarland matched each paragraph of the survey with what he believed to be the corresponding quote or passage from *The Great Pacific War*. A few paragraphs closely resembled Bywater's book, but for the most part, MacFarland seemed to overstate Haan's reliance on the book. Regardless, MacFarland advised that further investigation of Haan's survey was unnecessary and recommended closing the case.⁶⁶ His superiors in the Department of Justice and U.S. Army accepted his recommendations and the government officially closed its investigation of Haan's survey.⁶⁷ However, various branches of the U.S. government would continue to monitor Haan's activities for the next decade, compiling extensive files on Haan.

Though state authorities determined Haan's survey to be fraudulent, Haan cannot be categorically dismissed. During his interview with Bureau of Investigation special agent MacFarland, Haan revealed some important insights into his thinking and strategies in writing the survey. Throughout the interview, MacFarland continually challenged the accuracy of the survey. MacFarland wrote in his final report that Haan had confided to him that the survey "was prepared as a matter of protection to Koreans residing in the Territory of Hawaii" in the event of a war between the United States and Japan. By submitting the survey to military officials in Hawaii, Haan hoped that "the Koreans in the Territory would not be molested by the authorities here in that the said Survey would tend to establish the hostility of the Koreans towards the Japanese." Haan further explained to MacFarland, "the Koreans being under Japanese domination are fearful lest the American authorities in the event of a war should consider them alien enemies."⁶⁸ According to MacFarland, "Haan also mentioned that there is a general impression in oriental circles that in the event of war between the United States and Japan, the United States would take

66. Ibid., 26.

67. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146-2, May 10, 1933; 1766-S-146-3, May 24, 1933; 1766-S-146-4, June 30, 1933; and 1766-S-146-5, June 21, 1933.

68. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 1766-S-146-5, J.P. MacFarland, "Report of Investigation in Hawaii - Survey of Public Opinion Among the Japanese in the Territory of Hawaii," May 6, 1933, p. 20.

action to deprive [sic] all orientals, that is the alien born, and those born in the United States, of their citizenship.” Haan explained to MacFarland that the survey was intended to demonstrate that Koreans were “intensely loyal to the United States.”⁶⁹

Haan recognized the implications of Japan’s colonization of Korea for Koreans residing in the United States. In particular, he understood that the relationship of Koreans to the American government was closely tied to the national security interests of the United States. In the event of war between the United States and Japan, American state agencies would likely look upon Koreans and Japanese with equal suspicion. By submitting his survey, Haan hoped to convince military officials that Koreans in the United States were intensely anti-Japanese, thus allaying any lingering concerns that Koreans posed a threat to the national defense of the United States. Haan believed that the survey unequivocally demonstrated that Koreans in the United States would overwhelmingly support the American cause if war were to occur between the United States and Japan.

In a sense, Haan’s survey was a rhetorical performance of citizenship. As such, its significance can be found in its intentions rather than its factual accuracy. His explanations to MacFarland indicated that he consciously wrote the survey to underscore Korean loyalty to the United States. In doing so, Haan walked a fine line between competing notions of citizenship. In his synthesis of U.S. history, historian Gary Gerstle argues that two contradictory visions of citizenship have shaped the history of twentieth century America – civic nationalism and racial nationalism. For Gerstle, civic nationalism entails “political and social equality for all, irrespective of race, ethnicity, or nationality.”⁷⁰ According to Gerstle, the core elements of civic nationalism are inscribed in the founding principles of the American republic that promised equality for all people and a democratic government based on the people’s consent.

At the same time, Gerstle argues that racial nationalism constitutes an equally powerful ideological tradition, which was also present upon the birth of the American nation. Gerstle describes racial nationalism as an ideal that conceived the American nation in “ethnoracial terms, as a people held together by common blood and skin color and by an inherited fitness for self-government.”⁷¹ Under the thinking of racial nationalism, those of Asian,

69. Ibid., 21.

70. Gerstle, *American Crucible*, 8.

71. Ibid., 4.

African, and Latino descent were inherently unfit for full and equal participation in the nation and were thus to be excluded from the rights of citizenship.

Haan tried to negotiate between these contradictory, yet complementary, notions of citizenship. In his comments to MacFarland, Haan showed that he was well aware of a racial nationalism that would seek to abrogate the legal rights of not only Koreans but also all Asians in the United States in the event of a war between the United States and Japan. At the same time, Haan recognized the strains of civic nationalism in American society that could ameliorate the deleterious effects of racial nationalism. In presenting his survey, Haan aimed to promote a form of civic nationalism that demonstrated Korean loyalty and commitment to the core political values of American society. These performative aspects of citizenship were also evinced in “Korea’s Appeal,” which Haan had submitted to the U.S. Secretary of War.

Haan’s strategy was similar to previous Korean nationalists who sought to highlight the congruent interests between the United States and a free, democratic Korea. However, Haan’s lobbying tactics also represented a departure from his predecessors in that he sought to link the status of Koreans in the United States with events abroad. Haan did not seek the recognition of the Korean Provisional Government. Instead, he sought the political recognition of group rights for Koreans in the United States. His writings, thus, represented an initiatory act of citizenship in which Haan wrote from a distinctly “American” perspective and asserted the right of Korean participation in the U.S. public sphere.

On March 27, 1935, Kilsoo Haan, representing the Sino-Korean Peoples League, submitted a petition to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Territorial Legislature of Hawaii. In his petition, Haan requested the state government to investigate what he asserted to be the pernicious influence of Japanization activities in Hawaii, which he claimed were running rampant throughout the Hawaiian Islands. Haan wrote that “the tenacious and persistent resisting of Americanism by the Japanese leaders” had become “detrimental to Hawaii’s present political status.”⁷² In particular, Haan called for an official inquiry into organizations and activities “that emphasize racial consciousness and Japanese loyalty and culture in such a manner that the second generation Japanese are hampered in their preparation for American citizenship.”⁷³

72. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.202 11a – Haan, Kilsoo, Sino-Korean Peoples League, “Petition to the State and House of Representatives: Regular Session of 1935 - Territorial Legislature,” March 27, 1935, p. 2.

73. *Ibid.*

In seeking to alert legislators of what he believed to be the dangerous influence of widespread Japanization activities, Haan vigorously sought to shed light on the education of the American-born citizens of Japanese descent. Based on a report from an agent of the Sino-Korean Peoples League in Tokyo, he claimed to have uncovered a recent decision by the Japanese government to sponsor a plan for the free distribution of textbooks about Japan to high school students in the public school system of Hawaii. According to Haan, the textbooks, which would be compiled in Japan, were to be distributed through the Society of International Cultural Relations, an organization based in Japan dedicated to disseminating information about Japan in order to promote cultural ties with other nations. Quoting from a Japanese press report, Haan wrote that the “materials on instructions on Japan will cover almost every phase of modern Japan, embracing topics on the government, economic and social, art, etc., which will be presented in a way that will appeal to the average high school students [*sic*] in America.”⁷⁴

Haan, however, cautioned that the plan was not simply a benign gesture toward increased cultural understanding. Instead, Haan asserted that the Japanese government had ulterior motives in sanctioning the plan. Haan informed his readers, “we have reasons to believe that Japan is using the so-called international cultural movement and the various peace movements as a weapon for the purpose of maneuvering the United States into a position of inferiority and hope to degenerate the national spirit [*sic*].”⁷⁵

According to Haan, a proper understanding of the textbook issue must take into account Japanese expansionism on the Asian mainland and in the Pacific region. Haan asserted that Japan’s claims over its territorial acquisitions under the banner of “Asia for Asiatics” exposed “an intense nationalistic as well as racial solidification” that fiercely opposed Western policies and presence in East Asia.⁷⁶ Given this context, Haan maintained “such insidious foreign influence, dangerous to Americanism are being carried out indirectly” through the various Japanization activities, including the textbook plan, in Hawaii. With the overwhelming number of Japanese residents living in Hawaii, Haan continued, “unless the lawmakers of Hawaii find ways and means to harness and avert such activities, Hawaii’s situation will be perilous.”⁷⁷

74. *Ibid.*, 4-5.

75. *Ibid.*, 6.

76. *Ibid.*, 2.

77. *Ibid.*, 12.

Haan highlighted the high rates of dual citizenship among the Japanese residents of Hawaii arising from Japanization activities. Pointing out that an overwhelming portion of American-born Japanese in Hawaii were dual citizens of both the United States and Japan, Haan asked rhetorically if they were to be considered “technically 100 percent American citizens or half-American or half Japanese?”⁷⁸ According to Haan, these children, who comprised nearly sixty percent of the public school children in Hawaii, would in the near future become voting citizens of the United States. Haan believed these circumstances created significant implications for Hawaii’s political status. Given their dual citizenship, Haan warned that it was uncertain that they would act as U.S. citizens or as subjects of Japan. Again, he asked legislators, “Can they really and truly become loyal citizens if they are allowed to pursue the present Japanese policy?”⁷⁹ In seeking “to develop a political interest and loyalty centering around their Emperor,” Haan asserted that all Japanization activities ultimately served to undermine the Americanization of second generation Japanese, and as a result, Hawaii’s future political status and overall security was in great peril.⁸⁰

Haan’s petition to government authorities, as in his previous efforts, served to demonstrate his loyalty and the loyalty of the Korean people to American political and social ideals. As in his other writings, Haan unabashedly propagated a form of civic nationalism in seeking political membership for Koreans as ethnic Americans. In his petition to state legislators, Haan explained “that the spirit and motive of this petition is purely for the sake of advancement of constructive Americanism in Hawaii We believe in Americanism and in the preservation of its ideal.”⁸¹ Quoting from George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, Haan warned “against the insidious viles [sic] of foreign influence” inherent in all Japanization activities in Hawaii.⁸² Haan tried to convince lawmakers that the “non-assimilable foreign influence and culture” inherent in the Japanization of Hawaii presented a formidable challenge to the ideals of Americanism.⁸³

Despite his concerted efforts, Haan’s petition failed to elicit a positive response from state officials. On May 18, 1935, Haan received a letter from the Education Committee of the Hawaiian Senate informing him that his petition to

78. *Ibid.*, 10.

79. *Ibid.*, 8.

80. *Ibid.*, 3.

81. *Ibid.*, 14.

82. *Ibid.*, 3.

83. *Ibid.*, 14.

the state legislature had been referred to the Education Committee. However, the Committee had decided to take no action and that the petition was sent back to the Senate for filing.⁸⁴

Frustrated by his repeated failures to generate any active response from officials in Hawaii, Haan increasingly turned his attention toward the federal government in Washington D.C. On March 6, 1936, Haan wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull explaining his disappointment that his repeated efforts to alert leaders in Hawaii of the insidious implications of Japanization activities had yielded “very little success,” and now believed that all his “efforts to warn local authorities [were] wasted.” Because Hawaii stood as “America’s first line of defense,” Haan expressed his concern that the current situation posed an “impending danger.” Given the failure of local officials to understand the magnitude of the problem, Haan requested the State Department to begin its own investigation of Japanization activities in Hawaii.⁸⁵

Soon afterwards, Haan sent Hull another letter on May 22, 1936. Haan informed Hull that he had “succeeded in getting into the inner circle of the Japanese Consulate” in Hawaii. Haan explained to Hull that he was infiltrating the consulate as a spy to obtain classified information to aid the United States “in view of the present political situation.” Haan further explicated his goals for his espionage on behalf of the United States “One can not be too confident of our own strength until we are fully aware of the others’ ideas and scheme of expansion, commercially as well as politically.”⁸⁶

Haan notified Hull that he had been admitted to the “inner circle” of the Japanese consulate on a “90 day trial,” after which he would be included in higher-level activities within the organization. During his trial period, consulate officials, according to Haan, ordered him to not engage in any anti-Japanese propaganda in Hawaii and to submit a plan for containing Korean political activities. If the consulate decided to use his plan, he would be financially compensated for his services. Haan claimed that his purpose for notifying Hull of his involvement with the Japanese consulate was to ensure that U.S. government officials would not “misunderstand my motive and brand me a pro-Japanese and therefore anti-American.”⁸⁷ Assuring Hull that his actions were

84. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.202 11a – Lyhan, W.K., “Letter from Education Committee of Hawaiian Senate,” May 18, 1935.

85. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.202 11a – Lyhan, W.K., “Letter to Cordell Hull,” March 6, 1936.

86. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 2657-H-392-13, “Letter to Hull,” May 22, 1936, pp. 1-2.

87. *Ibid.*, 4.

motivated by his desire to aid the United States, he wrote, "I have lived with the Japanese and know them, what they say and do is of much concern to America."⁸⁸ As proof of his loyalty to the United States, he described his four-year record in working with U.S. Army G-2 and Navy intelligence officials in Hawaii since 1931 when he claimed he was first approached by army intelligence to assist them in their activities.⁸⁹

At the end of his letter to Hull, Haan concluded that he was at a crossroads in his activities implicitly alluding to his repeated failures to convince local authorities of the Japanese threat and the recent unfavorable turn of events in his dealings with army intelligence officials in Hawaii. "I am forced through circumstances and events that I must choose my future action. If I am of any value to America, I mean to your department I hope you would kindly help me financially as well as morally. If I am of no value to you than [sic] I must drop my contact with the Japanese consulate and mind my own livelihood."⁹⁰ In the end, neither Hull nor the State Department responded to Haan's request for support.

As his ability to carry on his activities in Hawaii continued to diminish, Kilsoo Haan apparently decided to leave the Japanese consulate in 1937 and depart for the U.S. mainland within the next year. Recent developments on the international front in 1937 also figured prominently into Haan's decision to leave for the U.S. mainland. Earlier in July 1937, Japanese and Chinese troops engaged in a skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge, nine miles southwest of Peking. The incident quickly escalated into an undeclared full-scale war between China and Japan. U.S. relations with Japan deteriorated rapidly after the outbreak of war in China as Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Franklin Roosevelt sharply criticized Japan's actions.

The war in China provided Haan and the Korean nationalist movement with new prospects. As noted earlier, Chinese support for Korean nationalist activities had increased dramatically after the Manchurian Incident in 1931. However, that support began to vacillate as factional rifts continually weakened the efficacy of the Korean nationalist movement. The Marco Polo Incident in 1937 drew the Chinese into a full-scale war against Japan, signaling a new stage of cooperation between Koreans and Chinese. The Chinese government immediately sought to strengthen its alliances with the Koreans. In July 1937,

88. *Ibid.*, 7.

89. *Ibid.*, 3-5.

90. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, MID 2657-H-392-13, "Letter to Hull," May 22, 1936, p. 7.

the Chinese government convened a joint conference with major Koreans leaders from both the right and left. Chinese officials stressed the urgent need to form a united front against the Japanese and offered substantial financial resources to the Korean nationalists. The Chinese government in particular requested Korean leaders to mobilize and train Koreans for intelligence operations.⁹¹

Reinvigorated by increased support from the Chinese, both leftist and rightist groups within the Korean independence movement scrambled to consolidate their respective forces. Supporters of the Korean Provisional Government, who represented the more conservative side, made significant progress in uniting their forces. Groups on the left were also active in consolidating and expanding efforts. Kim Won-bong's National Revolutionary Party, which had been formed in 1935, created alliances with other left-wing groups in China and formed the Korean National Front Federation. The left, under the direction of Kim Won-bong, also created an armed military unit called the Korean Volunteer Corps, comprised of two companies, to assist Chinese forces. One company was dispatched to the north into Manchuria while the other remained in war areas in China proper. Despite all these advances made by both sides on the left and right, they continued to operate their activities largely separate from each other. Near the end of 1938, the Chinese Nationalist government, which had united forces with the Chinese communists to fight the Japanese, urged the Koreans to form a similar united front of their own.⁹²

The war between China and Japan also presented increased opportunities to bring greater attention of the Korean cause to the U.S. government. Since World War I, Korean nationalists had believed that the United States would seek to aid China if a war broke out between Japan and China. Events in 1937, which led to a full-scale war between China and Japan, raised the hopes of many Korean nationalists.⁹³ Under these circumstances, Haan found new opportunities to expand the activities of the Sino-Korean Peoples League and left for Washington D.C. to take advantage of these changes.

In September 1938, Kilsoo Haan permanently left Hawaii. He first arrived in San Francisco to begin a nationwide speaking tour to publicize his views on Korean independence. He planned to conclude his tour in Washington D.C. where he hoped to meet with top government officials in the Roosevelt

91. Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 202.

92. *Ibid.*, 203-12.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

administration, including President Roosevelt himself.⁹⁴ Haan reached Washington D.C. in the spring of 1939, making his presence known almost immediately upon his arrival to the nation's capital. Haan requested in writing to meet with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. On April 6, Senator Guy Gillette of Iowa, whom Haan had befriended in Hawaii during the Congressional statehood hearings of 1937, wrote Hull an introductory letter on Haan's behalf.⁹⁵ Gillette spoke well of Haan, describing him as a valuable witness at the statehood hearings in Hawaii, where he revealed "possession of information and in control of certain channels of information that not only aided the Committee but would be of interest to the State Department." Gillette requested Hull give consideration to Haan by meeting with him. Representatives for Cordell Hull, however, replied to both Haan and Gillette that the Secretary of State was regrettably unable to meet with Haan due to his exhaustive schedule.⁹⁶

Haan nevertheless pressed for a meeting explaining that he had a series of urgent requests and pleas for the State Department to consider. On April 12, 1939, Haan sent Hull a lengthy memorandum containing these requests and pleas. In many ways, the memorandum departed from Haan's previous solicitations for assistance from the U.S. government. Rather than requesting direct aid in the form of arms, munitions, or money, Haan presented a plan stressing diplomacy. Proclaiming to represent the Sino-Korean Peoples League, Haan pleaded the State Department to extend a "sympathetic understanding of our problems in America and in the Far East."⁹⁷ In Washington D.C., Haan publicly declared the re-establishment of the Sino-Korean Peoples League. He officially announced the objectives of the League:

- 1) To create and foster Chinese-Korean relationship and promote their culture and welfare.

94. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.20211a/36-38.

95. For Haan's participation in the Congressional hearings for Hawaiian statehood, see Roger Bell, *Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984) and U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Hawaii, Statehood for Hawaii: Hearings before the Joint Committee on Hawaii Congress of the United States, 75th Cong., 2nd sess. pursuant S. Congress Resolution 18, October 6-22, 1937 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938).

96. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.20211a/40-41.

97. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.20211a/42, "Memoranda to Hull," April 12, 1939, p. 1.

- 2) To unite Korean effort in combating Japanese aggression and regain independence for Korea.
- 3) To inform America of the inimical designs of the Japanese and secure American aid for the Chinese war effort.⁹⁸

Haan emphasized that the League did not seek money, arms or munitions. Instead, he requested the State Department to issue a public statement or letter expressing “sympathy to the Chinese, the Koreans and the liberal-minded Japanese peasants, thus uplifting their morale in resisting Japanized Fascism in Asia.”⁹⁹ Haan explained that the United States could extend its public sympathy under the auspices of the “good offices” clause of the 1882 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Korea. Haan argued that the United States, by extending its moral influence, could ensure that the conflict in East Asia would remain “localized,” and the United States could therefore avoid any direct military involvement or commitments.¹⁰⁰ Haan declared that an official policy directive of issuing public statements of support from the United States could be extremely effective. Maintaining that such a policy would bring immeasurable moral uplift for the millions of Koreans resisting Japanese militarism in Korea, China, Siberia, and Japan, Haan asserted, “Sympathy will go a long way—in reality, its effect will be greater than supplying quantities of arms, munitions, or other aid.”¹⁰¹

The new diplomatic emphasis in Haan’s proposal to Hull partly reflected the greater sense of optimism arising from increased military cooperation between Chinese and Korean forces against the Japanese after 1937. The tactical shift in his proposal also indicated his keen awareness of the unwillingness of the U.S. government to enter a foreign war in Europe and Asia. The passage of the various neutrality laws throughout the 1930s reflected this staunch isolationist stance.¹⁰² The Neutrality Act of 1935 prohibited the sale of arms to all belligerent nations

98. U.S. National Archives, RG 38, Box 15, Folder – Analysis of the Korean Situation, “Topical Study - Analysis of the Korean Situation,” August 13, 1943, p. 16; RG 165, Box 2265, Folder 13: Korea – Nationalist Groups, “Korean Independence Movement in the United States and Hawaii,” December 2, 1942, p. 3; RG 165, Box 2260 – Korea, File 3020: Kilsoo K. Haan, “Memorandum on Kilsoo K. Haan Propaganda Activities,” December 20, 1943, p. 10.

99. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.20211a/42, “Memoranda to Hull,” April 12, 1939, p. 3.

100. *Ibid.*, 1-3.

101. *Ibid.*, 3.

102. In all, four neutrality acts were passed in 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939.

once the President had determined the existence of a state of war. The law also declared U.S. citizens could travel on belligerent ships but at their own risk. The law made no distinction between aggressor and victim; both sides were to be considered belligerents. The 1935 law did not include an embargo on the trade of supplies such as oil, steel, and copper, which could be easily converted into war materials. Two years later, Congress enacted the Neutrality Law of 1937, which defined belligerents not only in terms of nations at war but also included civil wars. The law in 1937 also empowered the President to add strategic materials other than munitions to the embargo list and prohibited all U.S. citizens from traveling on belligerent ships. The difficulties of maintaining neutrality became evident after war broke out between China and Japan. President Roosevelt decided not to proclaim the existence of a state of war in China because he believed invoking the Neutrality Act would put China at a disadvantage in that it would prevent China from purchasing strategic goods from the United States. Lacking the authority to authorize a selective embargo, Roosevelt's decision ended up benefiting Japan more than China due to the fact that Japan's volume of trade with the United States was far greater than China's.¹⁰³

Haan was well aware of these problems with the Neutrality Acts in his proposal to Hull. He pointed out that American sales of strategic materials, including oil, steel, and copper, to Japan, provided the Japanese military with a significant percentage of the necessary war-related materials to carry out its military campaigns against China. In the second part of his proposal, Haan suggested a plan in which the U.S. Congress enact a measure prohibiting the sale of these strategic materials to Japan for a two-year period.¹⁰⁴ During that period, the U.S. government would in turn appropriate 300 to 400 million dollars to purchase these same materials from the American firms who had been selling them to Japan. The United States then would hand these materials over to the U.S. Army and Navy, thereby significantly strengthening America's national defense. At the same time, the government would still be promoting economic recovery at home by ensuring that the business firms, who had previously sold materials to Japan, would not experience any monetary or employment losses.¹⁰⁵

103. In November 1939, Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1939, which contained a cash-and-carry provision that allowed belligerents to purchase American arms and strategic materials, but required them to pay cash in advance and to transport goods on their own ships.

104. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.20211a/42, "Memoranda to Hull," April 12, 1939, p. 3.

105. *Ibid.*, 3.

Haan argued that this aspect of his proposal had far-reaching implications. The cessation of the sale of strategic materials would significantly stall Japan's ability to continue its military aggressions in China. Haan declared that the U.S. refusal to sell war-related materials to Japan would serve to "break the morale of the mass of Japanese who are cooperating with the militarists under the misapprehension" that the United States was supporting the policies of the Japanese military by continuing to sell materials necessary for its campaign of war against China.¹⁰⁶ In doing so, the plan would ultimately lead to the breakdown of Japan's military program in and out of Japan. Thus, his plan ensured that the United States would not be drawn into war while simultaneously helping to stimulate the American economy. If the United States did not take the necessary steps to stop Japanese aggressions in China at the present moment, Haan cautioned that the Japanese would mount further aggressions into the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, Midway, and Alaska, all of which threatened U.S. interests.¹⁰⁷

Though Haan's proposal to Hull departed somewhat from his past writings, he continued to link the "domestic" interests of Koreans in the United States with activities and events abroad involving the Korean nationalist movement. As war mounted between Japan and China, Haan saw opportunities to expand his intelligence work to include activities on the U.S. mainland. He delineated the third and final part of his memoranda. Haan outlined a plan to utilize a coterie of some 250 to 300 Koreans residing in the United States, who arrived in the United States after 1924 for educational purposes. Haan argued that these highly educated Koreans were particularly well suited to conduct intelligence operations for the United States. All were graduates of American universities or currently matriculated in a degree program at a university. All were fluent in spoken Japanese and written Chinese and held a strong command of the English language.¹⁰⁸ And all would "gladly serve America if such opportunities are granted them."¹⁰⁹

Despite their qualifications and willingness to help the United States, Haan stated that the students were legally permitted to stay in the United States only temporarily due to their student status. After completing their educational requirements, all students who arrived after 1924 were required to return to

106. *Ibid.*, 4.

107. *Ibid.*, 1.

108. *Ibid.*, 5-6.

109. *Ibid.*, 5.

Korea.¹¹⁰ Many of these students dreaded going back to Korea for fear of persecution by Japanese colonial officials. According to Haan, the Japanese colonial government had accused nearly all student returnees after 1924 of conducting anti-Japanese activities while abroad. They were subsequently imprisoned under harsh conditions and forced publicly to pledge support and allegiance to the Japanese empire, leaving many “mentally and physically unfit for society” after their release from prison. Given these circumstances, Haan requested the State Department to grant these students in the United States “political refugee” status that would allow them to remain in the United States until the liberation of Korea. In turn, these students could be a valuable resource in protecting the national security of the United States.¹¹¹

Haan saw opportunities to expand the activities of the Sino-Korean Peoples League on the U.S. mainland by working in concert with these Korean students. Alluding to the success of the League in exposing Japanese activities in Hawaii, Haan proposed a cooperative plan between the Sino-Korean Peoples League and intelligence units in the U.S. Army and Navy for developing “self-defense measures” for the United States.¹¹² Haan recounted his experiences during his three months of speaking engagements throughout California before his arrival to Washington D.C. He claimed to have “interviewed hundreds of men and women,” who had expressed widespread support for an organization like the Sino-Korean Peoples League on the mainland.¹¹³

Haan implored the American government to adhere to its principles of democracy and freedom in considering his requests and pleas. He stated, “We believe America is the beacon light of democracy and the Government the pillar upholding this light That is why we believe that the present war between Japan and China is more than a war for territories or for raw materials. This is a war between two political philosophies – Democracy vs. Japanized Fascism.”¹¹⁴ He added that Koreans and Americans had a common cause against Japan. “Our aim is one : In principle all democratic people must forget the racial and

110. The passage of the 1924 Immigration Act barred the entry of all Asians, including Koreans, as legal immigrants to the United States. Responding to nativist pressures, the 1924 Immigration Act established the permanent exclusion of any “alien ineligible for citizenship.” Since Asians were denied the right of naturalization under an 1870 statute, further Asian immigration to the U.S. came to a decisive halt in 1924. Asian immigration would not resume again until after the end of WWII.

111. *Ibid.*

112. *Ibid.*

113. *Ibid.*, 6.

114. *Ibid.*

nationalistic line and stand by together to save democracy from being trampled by the militarists of Japan in Asia.”¹¹⁵ However, Haan was walking a fine line here. While his rhetorical appeals once again invoked the egalitarian civic nationalist traditions in American society, his statements could also equally arouse the racist and intolerant sentiments of a racial nationalism that would make little or no distinction between the Japanese and Koreans.

Seemingly aware of this duality, Haan made further appeals to the State Department. On April 28, 1939, Haan managed to personally meet with Maxwell M. Hamilton, who headed the Division of Far Eastern Affairs at the Department of State. Haan gave Hamilton a copy of his lengthy letter to Hull and urged Hamilton to consider granting the requests contained in the letter. Haan also submitted a copy of his testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 26. Haan believed that Hamilton would “be able to understand the hopes and aspirations of our people in America as well as in Korea” after reading his testimony. Haan once again asserted that the status of Koreans in the United States as ethnic Americans guided their motivation to aid the United States. “Primarily we are interested in America, and the Koreans in Hawaii are particularly concerned with the safety of Hawaii, due to the present political situation in Korea, as well as in China.”¹¹⁶ At the same time, Haan expressed his frustrations and anxieties over the constraints placed upon Koreans due to their racial and alien status in the United States:

Frankly speaking, an American who lives in Hawaii can pack up his trunk and come to America whenever he finds the conditions or situation is intolerable, whereas a Korean, whether the conditions are livable or not, is forced to stay in Hawaii. None of us desire to go back to Korea and a greater number of aliens are not allowed to come to America. Hence, our position is a forced one. Therefore, under this situation, we would like to do everything within our power and within our means to have Hawaii remain under the Stars and Stripes.¹¹⁷

Hamilton responded to Haan in person, telling him that the State Department’s official policies had already been set forth by the Secretary of State

115. *Ibid.*, 10.

116. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.20211a/44, “Letter to Hamilton,” April 28, 1939.

117. *Ibid.*

and the President and that he lacked any authority to make changes in foreign policy. As for changing the status of Korean students in the United States, Hamilton told Haan that he also did not have the authority for making changes to their immigration status. Instead, he suggested Haan discuss the matter with the Visa Division of the State Department.¹¹⁸ Haan's comments and concerns once again provided a portent of future events when the ambiguous status of Koreans in the United States would become an issue of controversy and contention following U.S. entrance into World War II.

“Koreans are Koreans”: World War II and the Disciplinary State

The overwhelming territorial advances made by the Axis powers in Europe and Asia soon after the outbreak of World War II in 1939 greatly heightened anxieties on the home front in the United States. In 1940, the American government, particularly fearful of fifth column threats, took greater measures to safeguard the nation's internal security. As part of these protective efforts, Congress enacted the Alien Registration Act (also known as the Smith Act) on June 28, 1940. The new law fortified existing laws regarding the admission and deportation of aliens and required the fingerprinting of all aliens in the United States. The primary purpose of the law, however, was to check subversive activities, making it unlawful for any person to advocate or teach the overthrow or destruction of the U.S. government by force or violence.

With the passage of the Alien Registration Act, Kilsoo Haan saw an opportunity to advance the status and rights of Koreans living on the U.S. mainland and Hawaii. Soon after the enactment of the new law, Haan contacted Earl Harrison, Director of Alien Registration at the Department of Justice in Washington D.C. Haan requested that Koreans in the United States and Hawaii have the right to register as Koreans and not as Japanese subjects when registering under the Alien Registration Act. In a written response on August 19, Harrison granted Haan's request. Haan widely publicized the ruling as a significant victory in the legal recognition of Korean rights in the United States. Haan exclaimed that Harrison's decision amounted to a special exemption for Koreans because Koreans were officially defined as Japanese subjects according to international law.¹¹⁹

118. U.S. National Archives, Decimal File 894 (1930-39) LM58 Reel 12, 894.20211a/44, "Hamilton Memorandum," April 28, 1939.

119. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, Regional File, Box 2266, Folder 5: Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41).

Haan's concern about the predicament of Koreans in the United States increased as Japan continued to mount its aggressive military assault in the Pacific. On February 27, 1941, Haan wrote to U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. In his letter to Morgenthau, Haan, representing the Sino-Korean Peoples League, expressed his desire "to clarify some of the apprehensions which exist among the Korean people in the Hawaiian Islands and in America." Mentioning growing reports that the U.S. government would likely freeze all the financial assets of the Axis' powers held in the United States, Haan explained his particular concern that "if and when America freezes all the Japanese financial holdings or confiscates the Japanese financial holdings in the event of war, all such properties and financial holdings belonging to the Koreans too may be frozen or confiscated because of the international practice by its various governments in treating Koreans holding the status of a Japanese subject." Referring to the ruling of Earl Harrison at the Department of Justice the previous year, Haan petitioned the Treasury Department to give Koreans "the same consideration and rule that the Koreans are Koreans and not to be considered as Japanese" and to exempt Koreans in America from having their financial holdings frozen or confiscated.¹²⁰

A few months later on June 17, 1941, Haan once again wrote to the Treasury Department, directing his correspondence to John W. Pehle, Controller for Foreign Funds. By this time, the U.S. government, administered by the Treasury Department, had frozen the U.S. financial holdings of Germany and Italy and most of the subjugated nations under Axis control in Europe. The freezing of Japanese financial assets in the United States had not yet occurred but seemed imminent as relations between the United States and Japan became increasing strained.¹²¹ Haan wrote that "Koreans are truly an unwilling subjected people under the Jap-militarist government – we 3,150 alien Koreans are in reality political refugees, living under the protection and good grace of the American government . . . we are loyal to America and will be always ready to serve the best interest of the United States in this time of grave National Emergency." As such, Haan once again urged the Treasury Department to provide an "early understanding" of the situation of Korean immigrants by exempting them in the event of an order to freeze Japanese financial assets in the United States.¹²²

120. Ibid.

121. On July 26, 1941, a day after Japan's seizure of French Indo-China, the U.S. government ordered the complete cessation of trade with Japan and the freezing of her assets in the U.S.

122. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, Regional File, Box 2266, Folder 4: Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41).

Haan took further precautionary measures to ensure that Koreans would be distinguished from the Japanese in the event of war between the United States and Japan. In a letter to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, on July 30, 1941, Haan requested that the Sino-Korean Peoples League be permitted to issue identification cards to Korean aliens in the United States to distinguish them from the Japanese. Hoover referred the letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Department of Justice. On August 19, 1941, Lemuel B. Schofield, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, responded to Haan granting his request for the issuance of identification cards for Koreans. Schofield stated that his office had no reason to reject Haan's proposal as long as Haan did not attempt "to imitate or duplicate Federal documents."¹²³ Haan publicly announced the ruling as yet another step towards the national recognition of Korean status in the United States.

Despite the optimism generated by Haan's efforts, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, brought devastating consequences for the status of Koreans living throughout the United States and Hawaii. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the United States declared war on Japan, and all Japanese aliens in the United States became "enemy aliens," subject to certain restrictions. The Treasury Department ordered the freezing of the financial holdings of all Japanese nationals on the U.S. mainland and Hawaii. In Hawaii, the U.S. military, fearing espionage and sabotage activities from the numerically dominant Japanese residing on the islands, established martial law on December 7, and assumed full authority over civilian affairs, whereby the Japanese in Hawaii were subjected to additional stringent restrictions. Regarded as subjects of Japan due to Korea's subjugation under Japanese rule, Koreans in the United States found themselves classified as enemy aliens and subject to many of the same restrictions imposed upon alien Japanese.¹²⁴

The predicament confronting Koreans in the United States after December 7 seemed to confirm all of Haan's fears in the event of war between the United States and Japan. Despite all his previous efforts to position Koreans as distinct from the Japanese, the U.S. government failed to distinguish Koreans from Japanese. Undeterred by the recent turn of events, however, Haan promptly

123. Ibid.

124. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, Regional File, Box 2266, Folder 4: Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41); RG 165, Regional File, Box 2266, Folder 5: Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41); Michael E. Macmillan, "Unwanted Allies: Koreans as Enemy Aliens in World War II," *The Hawaiian Journal of History* 19 (1985): pp. 179-203; Lauriel E. Eubank, "The Effects of the First Six Months of World War II on the Attitudes of Koreans and Filipinos Toward the Japanese in Hawaii," (M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, February 1943).

took action to rectify the situation. Days after Pearl Harbor, Haan petitioned several government and military officials to aid Koreans in the United States. On December 9, Haan once again wrote to John W. Pehle at the Treasury Department. Haan reminded Pehle of their earlier correspondences in February and June, in which Pehle told Haan that the Treasury Department could not act on the hypothetical condition of war between the United States and Japan. Asserting that war was now “a matter of fact,” Haan resolutely asked Pehle to exempt Korean financial holdings from being frozen or confiscated as enemy property. Haan notified Pehle that he had recently received word from Koreans in Hawaii, California, and Chicago that their funds had already been frozen by the banks, pending further orders from the Treasury Department. Alluding to the ruling by Earl Harrison in August 1940, regarding Korean registration under the Alien Registration Act, Haan requested the Treasury Department to recognize Koreans as Koreans, not as Japanese subjects, and to release the funds that had already been frozen as well as issuing an order to exempt Koreans from any further freezing or confiscation of their funds and properties.¹²⁵ Haan emphasized the need for Koreans to carry on with their regular business transactions to maintain their livelihoods, but also for the continuation of their activities in assisting the United States in the war effort against Japan.

Pehle responded to Haan’s request in a short noncommittal letter stating that the release of blocked funds would be considered on an individual basis determined by facts and circumstances for each case. Pehle recommended Haan to direct the affected individuals to meet with their local banking officials to explain their situation.¹²⁶

On December 9, Haan also sent a letter of request to Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Chief of U.S. Army intelligence at the U.S. War Department, in Washington D.C. Haan explained to Miles that “Koreans throughout Hawaii and America are very much in distress due to the fact that they fear misunderstanding which may come about as to the identity of Koreans as from the Japanese.” Haan asked Miles if his office could issue identification badges with their photograph and the alien registration number printed below their name so that Koreans could be properly identified as Koreans and not as Japanese. Haan noted that the Department of Justice in August had approved of the issuance of identification cards to Korean aliens but ruled against the use of the alien registration number issued by the Department of Justice under the

125. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, Regional File, Box 2266, Folder 4: Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41).

126. *Ibid.*

Alien Registration Act of 1940. Haan, however, emphasized that the identification cards could only be effective if they indicated some official proof of approval from the Army or Justice Department.¹²⁷

A few days later, Haan wrote to officials at the State Department requesting that Koreans no longer be classified as Japanese subjects and be permitted to travel as friendly aliens such as the Chinese. Pointing to his indefatigable record to protect American interests by exposing anti-American activities among the Japanese, Haan exclaimed that Koreans had proven themselves to be loyal and valuable allies of the United States and that their status in the United States should be based on domestic concerns rather than “technical international legal points.” Haan emphasized that the recognition of Koreans as Koreans by the State Department or Justice Department was a “purely domestic policy, which has no bearing on foreign policy.” Maxwell Hamilton, who headed the Division of Far Eastern Affairs at the State Department, responded to Haan’s requests by informing him that the situation regarding Korean status in the United States was currently under consideration by his Department and that he had brought the matter to the attention of the Department of Justice.¹²⁸

Meanwhile, other Korean leaders came forward to petition the U.S. government to change the status of Koreans. Most notably, Syngman Rhee once again emerged to prominence following the attack on Pearl Harbor. During much of the 1930s, Rhee had resided in Hawaii, involved in various educational and religious activities within the Korean community of Honolulu. Following the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, Rhee moved to Washington D.C. to once again oversee the Korean Commission. Rhee’s activities in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor marked his reentrance into the political life of Washington D.C., where he would remain permanently throughout the war.

Rhee approached officials in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department. Writing to Harold B. Hoskins on December 9, Rhee pointed out that all Korean aliens in the United States and Hawaii had registered as “a distinct Korean group” under the Alien Registration Act in 1940 based on the official ruling by the Department of Justice that permitted Koreans to register as Koreans instead of Japanese subjects. Rhee expressed his dismay and concern upon receiving news from his compatriots in Los Angeles and Chicago that local authorities had closed their bank accounts. Asserting that there was “every reason for the United States to treat the Koreans as a friendly people,” Rhee asked the State Department to respond appropriately to ensure that local

127. *Ibid.*

128. *Ibid.*

officials would release the frozen financial holdings of all Koreans in the United States and Hawaii.¹²⁹

Hoskins responded quickly, informing Rhee that he had referred the matter to L.M.C. Smith at the Special Defense Unit at the Department of Justice. In his letter to Smith, Hoskins described Rhee as a long time contact with the State Department, well known for his strong opposition to Japanese rule in Korea. Hoskins requested Smith's department to reconsider the status of Koreans in the United States, stating that he hoped that the Justice Department "can be of assistance to see that Koreans are given a status distinct from the Japanese in various matters, including the unfreezing of any funds which may have been frozen through a misconception of their relations to the Japanese."¹³⁰

Soon after on December 15, 1941, the Justice Department announced that the financial holdings of Koreans would be unfrozen.¹³¹ In a press meeting, Korean leaders in Washington D.C. announced the release of funds as the result of the Korean Commission's protestations to the U.S. government in which the Commission had adamantly repudiated Japanese rule over Korea. The leaders added that the federal banks had "misinterpreted" an order to freeze Japanese assets by mistakenly including Koreans. Due to their efforts in Washington, they claimed that the U.S. government had acknowledged its error and promptly ordered banks "to let the Koreans operate business as usual."¹³²

Despite the favorable ruling, many Koreans were still uncertain of their status. In January 1942, the Department of Justice announced that all enemy aliens were required to re-register under the Alien Registration Act. On January 14, Kilsoo Haan wrote Earl Harrison at the Department of Justice, requesting a clarification of Korean status. Haan described the confusion among Koreans in the United States surrounding the recent announcement given the fact that the Department of Justice had permitted Koreans to register as Koreans earlier in 1940. As such, Haan inquired whether Koreans were exempt from the re-registration program. If Koreans were indeed required to re-register, they would hence be officially classified as enemy aliens, which Haan noted would be "contrary to all the good intention proclamations

129. U.S. National Archives, RG 59, 895.01/60-2/26 Rhee to Hoskins, December 9, 1941.

130. U.S. National Archives, RG 59, 895.01/60-1/26 Hoskins to Smith, December 10, 1941.

131. "Koreans Hold Mass Meeting," *Sinhan Minbo*, December 18, 1941.

132. U.S. National Archives, RG 59 895.01/93; RG 165 Regional File 2266 Folder 4 Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41).

proclaimed by the State Department.” Haan sharply criticized that such an action would constitute “an unjust and inhuman act,” and demanded that the United States government live up to its democratic ideals and principles, writing that when “the United States of America attempts forcefully to change our God-given rights to live and breathe as Koreans into Japs – what difference is there between Japan’s inhuman treatment of subject people and of the United States?”¹³³

On January 23, Harrison replied to Haan’s letter. Harrison informed Haan of the following official ruling: “The regulations, just adopted, governing Certificates of Identification for aliens of enemy nationalities provide that Koreans who, under the Alien Registration Act of 1940, registered as Koreans, are not required to apply for Certificates of Identification, providing that such persons have not at any time voluntarily become German, Italian or Japanese citizens or subjects.”¹³⁴ Harrison’s ruling implicitly assumed that Koreans were not to be considered enemy aliens.

Before issuing this ruling to the public, the Justice Department had consulted with State Department officials, who had expressed “no objection to the plans of the Department of Justice for distinguishing between Koreans and Japanese in the United States.”¹³⁵ Days later, the Department of Justice issued an official statement through the office of the Attorney General. On January 26, 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle announced that Austrians, Austrian-Hungarians, and Koreans were exempt from the order requiring aliens to apply for certificates of identification. The order had mandated that all German, Italian, and Japanese nationals 14 years old and older must apply for certificates of identifications beginning February 2, 1942.¹³⁶ On February 9, the Department of Justice provided an even more definitive policy regarding Korean status in the United States. Attorney General Biddle issued a statement lifting all enemy alien restrictions from:

all Austrians, Austro-Hungarians and Koreans who registered as such under the Alien Registration Act of 1940 and who have not since that time voluntarily become citizens or subjects of Germany, Italy, or Japan . . . This

133. U.S. National Archives, RG 59 895.01/60-10/26 Haan to Harrison, January 14, 1942.

134. U.S. National Archives, RG 59 895.01/60-10/26 Harrison to Haan, January 23, 1942.

135. U.S. National Archives, RG 59 895.01/60-8/26 Hoskins memorandum, January 19, 1942.

136. “Alien Listing Station Planned,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 27, 1942.

exemption is designed to exempt the many thousand loyal aliens of Austrian, Austro-Hungarian, and Korean nationality who have never been sympathetic to the government imposed upon their homelands by military conquests.¹³⁷

The situation in Hawaii was markedly different, where Koreans remained classified as enemy aliens until the end of martial law in late 1944. In the immediate aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, Lieutenant General Walker C. Short, commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department, established martial law and assumed full control over the islands under the title of Military Governor. In the following days, the Office of the Military Governor issued a series of "directives" that imposed special restrictive measures on Japanese nationals living in Hawaii. Although none of these directives specifically listed Koreans, the restrictive measures applied to Koreans and Japanese alike. Military officials had categorized Koreans as subjects of Japan and were accordingly lumped together with the Japanese as enemy aliens. Under martial law, the Military Governor had assumed full authority over all civilian affairs, and federal offices such as the State and Justice Departments had little or no influence on the governance of Hawaii. Consequently, the rulings by the Department of Justice and the State Department that exempted Koreans from alien enemy restrictions on the mainland did not apply to Koreans residing in Hawaii.¹³⁸

In response, Koreans in Hawaii initiated an extensive campaign to overturn their legal status as enemy aliens. Korean protestations led to the easing of some of the restriction measures imposed upon them. However, the overall situation for Koreans in Hawaii did not change substantially until the end of 1943.¹³⁹ Although their enemy-alien classification remained intact until the end of martial law in October 1944, Military Governor Lt. General Robert C.

137. Samuel W. King papers, State Archives of Hawaii, M-473-869 "The Legal Status of Koreans: A Muddle Caused by our Indecisive Foreign Policy," undated.

138. U.S. National Archives, RG 165, Regional File, Box 2266, Folder 4: Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41); RG 165, Regional File, Box 2266, Folder 5: Korea - Propaganda Releases (1939-41); Michael E. Macmillan, "Unwanted Allies: Koreans as Enemy Aliens in World War II"; and Lauriel E. Eubank, "The Effects of the First Six Months of World War II on the Attitudes of Koreans and Filipinos Toward the Japanese in Hawaii."

139. For more extensive study of these experiences of Koreans in Hawaii, see Michael E. Macmillan, "Unwanted Allies: Koreans as Enemy Aliens in World War II," and Lili M. Kim, "The Pursuit of Imperfect Justice: The Predicament of Koreans and Korean Americans on the Homefront During World War II," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 2001).

Richardson exempted Koreans from enemy-alien curfew restrictions on December 4, 1943, which many Koreans in Hawaii had considered to be the most restrictive and unjust measure issued against them under enemy-alien status.¹⁴⁰

These changes came in the wake of the announcement of the Cairo Declaration days earlier on December 1, in which the heads of state for the United States, Great Britain, and China pledged their determination to restore the independence of Korea “in due course.” International circumstances once again brought about significant changes in the focus of the Korean independence movement. For Koreans throughout the diaspora, the Cairo Declaration represented the long-awaited recognition of Korean independence by the international community and thus marked a decisive turning point in the activities of the Korean nationalist movement. Nationalist organizations in the United States and abroad once again turned to lobbying extensively for the official recognition of the exiled Korean Provisional Government. For Koreans in the United States and Hawaii, the organizing metaphor shifted from viewing the United States as a disciplinary state to one of a liberator that could guarantee the restoration of Korea’s freedom and sovereignty.

Although this discursive shift marked a change in the content of the lobbying efforts of Korean immigrants, strategic reliance on U.S. sovereignty remained constant and became further entrenched during and following the 1940s. Kilsoo Haan’s activities during the 1930s are key to understanding this historical trajectory in the Korean nationalist movement. However, just as the legal and racialized status of Koreans in the United States was often a tenuous one, so was the status of Korean independence and the Korean Provisional Government in relation to the priorities of the U.S. government during World War II. Consequently, the struggle for diplomatic recognition of the KPG would once again engender debilitating controversies and ruptures, prefiguring the tragic outcome of civil war on the Korean peninsula in the post WWII period.

140. “Gen. Richardson is Thanked By Koreans for Blackout Privilege,” *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, December 12, 1943.

Conclusion

The circumstances of colonialism and exile necessitated that the Korean nationalist movement create a sovereign national state entirely from abroad. As a result, efforts within the Korean liberation movement throughout the diaspora systematically attempted to create a sovereign political institution, embodied in the Korean Provisional Government, which could be considered legitimate by members of the nation and by members of the international community. However, the challenges of defining and achieving coherent political action under the conditions of statelessness and exile constrained the ability of the Korean diaspora to establish a sovereign political institution of its own.

Following the breakdown of the KPG in the 1920s, Koreans had no legitimate authority of their own that could function as a sovereign state within the international system of nation-states. With no central authority to mobilize and direct the diaspora, struggles for political power from abroad became highly localized. Under these conditions, Kilsoo Haan astutely recognized that U.S. sovereignty was fundamental to achieving the national interests of Koreans, which I have argued led to new modes of organizing and new forms of political agency. Kilsoo Haan showed great insight in understanding that the relationship between “foreign” and “domestic” interests for Koreans in the United States was not dichotomous but rather could be inextricably linked in a way that did not contradict their loyalty and allegiances to the United States. His activities thus marked an important shift in the politics of the liberation movement as Korean nationalist activities in the United States became increasingly ethnicized.

Korean liberation struggles in the 1930s became so reconfigured by its localization in the United States that strategic visions within the movement began to change and increasingly reflected the realities of living and working within a U.S. environment. Korean immigrants came to demand the recognition and fair treatment of their interests and status abroad as well as in the United States. In this manner, they sought political membership as ethnic Americans in the U.S. public sphere that involved recognition of their national status as Koreans, which was separate and distinct from the Japanese. In effect, Korean immigrants not only pursued the recognition of the national sovereignty of Korea but also recognition as a distinct ethnic group in the United States. Korean diasporic nationalism thus facilitated the development of a collective identity as ethnic Americans, which came to be reflected in an unconditional acceptance of the United States as the guarantor of the national interests of Korea.